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Abstract 
This Paper aims to examine the impact of the 
implementation of Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR) 
Regulation on income smoothing practice of commercial 
banks in Indonesia. The LDR Regulation is industry-
specific regulation. There are conflicting arguments 
regarding the ability of industry-specific regulation in 
reducing income smoothing of banks. The samples used 
in this research are 28 listed commercial banks in 
Indonesia for the periods 2008 -  2011. Overall, there are 
112 bank-annual observations. The test focuses 
specifically on panel time series cross-sectional models. A 
T-test of Fixed effects model of panel data and paired 
sample t-test are used to test the hypothesis. The result 
indicates that commercial bank managers smooth their  
income through the allowance for impairment loss. 
However, the implementation of the LDR regulation can 
not reduce the level of income smoothing of publicly 
commercial banks in Indonesia. The level of income 
smoothing after the LDR regulation is lower than the 
level of income smoothing before the implementation of 
the LDR regulation, but the differences are not 
significant.
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Introduction 
The regulation issued by Indonesian central bank (i.e. Bank Indonesia), on November 1st 
2010  Number 12/19/PBI/20101, regarding the Statutory Reserve Requirement at Bank 
Indonesia in Rupiahs and Foreign Currencies for Commercial Banks, was the first 
regulation which rigorously require the range 78%-100% of loan to deposit ratio 
(hereafter, LDR) for commercial banks. This regulation is one of industry-specific 
regulations which obligates banks to maintain their LDR in at least 78%. Banks with the 
LDR in the given range denote that the bank has capital adequate ratio (CAR) of 14%. This 
condition indicates that the bank is secure and has the adequate capital. 
Nevertheless, in 2010-2011, fulfilling the LDR requirement, 78% - 100%, is a major 
obstacle to some banks, not only to small banks, but also to the big ones. Difficulties in 
channeling credit to the community are caused by high lending rates, which make people 
hesitant to take credit. Additionally, collateral requirements, credit terms and high 
administrative costs can be difficult for society. By 31st March 20112, some large banks in 
Indonesia still found it difficult to achieve the new LDR rate. Some large banks with LDR 
percentages lower than 78% are, Bank Mandiri (63.1%), Bank Central Asia (51.3%), and 
Bank Negara Indonesia (64.5%).   
In June 2011, these three banks collectively give approximately 30% of total loans to the 
public in Indonesia. It is estimated that these three banks will provide an additional loan 
amounting to Rp145 trillion (U.S. $ 16.1 billion to meet this requirement which is 
approximately 9.1% of total loans outstanding in June. Even so, the LDR of the three banks 
was 75.3%, not 78% yet. However, by July 2011 until today September 2016, most 
commercial banks had more than 78% LDR. This shows that the new regulation 
encourages commercial banks with lower LDR to increase the growth of lending to the 
public. Consequently, the lending rate of banks is growing. The granting of credit increases 
                                                          
1 Currently, this regulation has been revised with PBI No. 17/11/PBI/2015 regarding the Statutory Reserve Requirement 
at Bank Indonesia in Rupiahs and Foreign Currencies for Commercial Banks. Based on this regulation, Loan to Deposit 
Ratio (LDR) will be loan to funding ratio (LFR). The upper limit of LFR is 94 % and boundary bottom is 78 %. The bank 
can more enlarge their loan although the numbers of their treasure do not increase. 
2 The sanctions for commercial banks which can not fulfill the minimum LDR of the regulation 12/19/PBI/2010 had been 
started on March 31, 2011.  
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each month. On average, annual increase in 2010 and 2011 is 2.1%. However, compared to 
the number of credits in 2010, the amount of credit granted by commercial banks has 
increased in 2011. For example, the amount of credit in January 2010 is Rp1, 405.640 
billion increased to Rp1, 746.005 billion in January 2011 (an increase of 24.21%). The 
biggest increase in lending occurred in November 2011, amounting to 26.05%. And the 
lowest credit enhancement occurred in June 2011 compared to June 2010 amounted to 
22.95%. 
This reality illustrates that commercial banks continue to endeavor to meet LDR 
requirement. The question is why is the LDR important for a bank? Because the LDR 
indicates the level of liquidity of a bank, the ratio shows an adequate balance between 
banks invested funds (assets) and its financial resources (liabilities) ensuring that a bank is 
at all times able to fund its operations under any conditions and at a reasonable cost. The 
larger the loan, assuming deposit is increased, the greater the ability of the bank to meet 
claims presented for immediate payment. A strengthening in the LDR may indicate that a 
bank has an ability to drive its growth and to protect itself against a sudden recall of its 
funding, especially a bank that relies on deposits to fund growth (Brewer 1980).  
The next question is what is the relation between the obligation to meet the LDR regulation 
and the behavior of bank managers to manage their reported earnings? The answer to this 
question will be explained in the following discussion.  
Reaching higher LDR forces banks to boost their lending growth. Consequently, banks trim 
down their loan interest rate and may step up their deposit interest rate. The other 
implication is that banks will use the other resources with higher cost of fund by issuing 
bonds or stocks to obtain funds3. As a result, net interest margin is lower. Although banks 
finance their lending by using cheaper cost of funds like checking and accounts, net interest 
margins of banks are higher. Checking and accounts, however are liquid, and there is no 
time limit for these resources. In Indonesian cases, most commercial banks financed their 
lending by deposit rather than by checking and accounts, which is shown in Figure 1 and 2 
below. In both 2010 and 2011 periods, commercial banks in Indonesia use more deposit 
than accounts and checking either in rupiahs or in foreign currency.  
                                                          
3 Issuing bonds or stocks to obtain funds is not considered in this study. 
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Figure 1. Checking, Deposit, and Accounts in Rupiahs and Foreign Currency in 2010 
(in billion rupiahs) 
 
Sources: Indonesian Banking Statistic by Bank Indonesia, Monthly, 2010 and 2011 
 
Figure 2. Checking, Deposit, and Accounts in Rupiahs and Foreign Currency in 2011 
(in billion rupiahs) 
 
Sources: Indonesian Banking Statistic by Bank Indonesia, Monthly, 2010 and 2011 
Consequently, interest revenue and interest expense of banks are getting higher. It means 
that operating income of the banks should be higher as well because high credit growth will 
increase interest revenues while operating expenses to increase the credit has also 
increased. Even though, operating income of commercial banks in Indonesia is getting 
higher month by month, the enhancement is not substantial because the operating 
expenses are excessively high. On average 89% of revenue is expense. This condition is 
shown in Figure 3 and 4 below. 
Figure 3. Operating Revenues, Operating Expenses, and Operating Incomes Commercial 
Banks January – October 2010 (in billion rupiahs) 
 
Sources: Indonesian Banking Statistic by Bank Indonesia, Monthly, 2010 and 2011  
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Figure 3 above shows that revenue, expense and operating income in 2010 continue to 
increase, however, a very significant improvement has begun to occur from September to 
December. When compared to January, revenue, expense and operating income are Rp41, 
333 billion, Rp40, 242 billion and Rp1, 090 billion respectively, in December, an increase 
occurs respectively  at 749%, 652% with operating income increased by 4330%. Although 
the regulation of statutory reserves and LDR was effective on 1 November 2010, media 
sources suggest that commercial banks have started to anticipate the regulation due to the 
sanctions on banks that do not meet the requirements set by the regulation. Therefore, 
even before the regulation is the launch of credit by commercial banks continued to 
increase. 
Based on Figure 4 below, revenues, expenses and operating incomes in 2011 began to 
increase significantly since June 2011. In January, instead operating incomes are minus 
(loss) amounting Rp 5, 660 billion as the operating income is Rp32, 288 billion, less than 
the operating expenses which amounted to Rp37, 948 billion. In October 2011, the revenue, 
expense and operating income of commercial banks in Indonesia amounted to Rp322, 288 
billion, Rp278, 876 billion and Rp43, 411 billion respectively. 
Figure 4. Operating Revenues, Operating Expenses, and Operating Incomes of Commercial 
Banks January – October 2011 (in billion rupiahs) 
 
Sources: Indonesian Banking Statistic by Bank Indonesia, Monthly, 2010 and 2011. 
Based on these two figures, it can be seen that the operating income increase is relatively 
stable even though the increase of operating revenue is extremely high. Table 1 below 
illustrates the percentage among operating income components in 2010 and 2011.  
Compared to interest revenue, operating income is just 11%, on average. In 2010, the 
lowest operating income occurred on January, just 3% and the highest occurred on August, 
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15%.  In 2011, the lowest operating income occurred also in January, amounting to -18%, 
and the highest occurred on February until May at 15%. 
Table 1. The Percentage among Operating Income Components in 2010 and 2011. 
  
Months 
Jan Feb Mrt Apr May Jun Jul Agt Spt Oct Nov Dec 
Revenue 10 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Expense 10 0.97 0.93 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 
Operating income 10 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Revenue 11 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Expenses 11 1.18 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.86 
Operating income 11 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.17 
Sources: Indonesian Banking Statistic by Bank Indonesia, Monthly, 2010 and 2011  
Very low and relatively stable operating incomes, in addition to consistently increasing 
interest revenues could be caused by consistently high operating expense. On average, 
operating expenses are 89% in 2010 and 2011. The highest operating expenses in 2010 
amounting to 97% occurred in January and the lowest ones at 85% occurred in August. In 
2011, the highest operating expenses amounting to 118% occurred in January and the 
lowest ones at 85% occurred in February until May. The comparison between operating 
and non operating expenses can be seen in table 2 below. Based on the table, with the 
exception of January 2010, operating income is higher than non-operating income and 
fluctuates month by month. 
Table 2. Operating Expenses and Non Operating Expenses in 2010 and 2011. 
Account Months 
Jan Feb March  April May June July Augt Sept Oct Nov Dec 
Opt. Exp. 
2010 40.242 74.078 105.208 138.705 171.754 220.024 171.452 192.864 223.101 249.501 271.417 302.549 
Non opt. 
Exp.2010 82.589 5.301 10.771 31.406 28.331 42.531 42.608 46.152 57.223 58.989 65.936 73.218 
Opt. 
Exp.2011 37.948 52.077 80.768 106.466 131.315 160,370 191,935 225,530 250,863 278,876 
         
307,383  
       
334,322  
Non opt. 
Exp. 2011 8.631 19.48 28.828 47.062 55.023 50,276 63,796 62,361 68,869 82,639 
           
80,525  
         
89,392  
Sources: Indonesian Banking Statistic by Bank Indonesia, Monthly, 2010 and 2011  
Constantly high operating expenses can be caused by volatile accrual accounts. One of the 
accrual components of bank income statement is the allowance to anticipate the 
impairment value of assets, specifically credit value, i.e., loan loss provision or allowance 
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for impairment losses4. There is an indication that banks managers smooth their reported 
earnings through loan loss provision (Ma 1988; Bhat 1996; Kanagaretnam et al. 2003, and 
Anandarajana et al. 2007) month by month in the interim report to reduce earnings 
variability in the annually reported earnings (Kerstein and Rai 2007; Jacob and Jorgensen 
2007, Brown and Pinello 2007; Das et al. 2009). This condition raises the question: why 
should the managers of a bank want to smooth accounting earnings using loan-loss 
provisions? An answer is suggested by Greenawalt and Sinkey (1998) in their paper: “when 
bank income is up, it makes sense to inventory some of it as a provision for loan losses—the 
notion of saving for a rainy day, conversely, when income is down, the inventory can be drawn 
down to cover actual loan losses”.  
Based on the above phenomena, this research is aimed to examine the effect of the first 
time new rates of industry-specific regulation (LDR regulation) and the LDR itself on 
income smoothing behavior of commercial banks in Indonesia. This objective is tightened 
by empirical evidence provided by Bhat (1996) which conclude that banks with high loans-
to-deposit ratio are likely to smooth their earnings. Unfortunately, Bhat (1996) did not 
discuss the reason why high loan to deposit ratio encourages the managers to smooth their 
income.  
Theory and Hypothesis Development  
Institution Setting  
Hasan and Buchari (2017) show that industrial diversification motivates managers to 
earnings management. Discretionary accruals are higher in relatively more diversified 
companies. Whereas, discretionary accruals are lower in less diversified companies. 
Banking industry is one of the most heavily regulated industries in Indonesia. It is not 
surprising that there are so many industry-specific regulations for banks to normalize 
commercial banks’ capital and activities. The regulations are issued not only by Indonesian 
central bank and Capital Market Supervisory Agency (Bapepam5) but also by Indonesian 
accounting standard setter. The regulation for loan to deposit ratio is one of several 
                                                          
4
 There are no differences between loan loss provisions and allowance for impairment losses in term of definition and 
accounting procedures. The usage  of term of loan loss provisions or allowance for impairment losses is depend on the 
term used in statement of financial accounting standard in certain country. In SFAS of Indonesia, it is called allowance 
for impairment losses. 
5 Bapepam has been changed by Financial Services Otorisation (OJK) now. 
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regulations issued by central bank. According to Regulation No. 12/19/PBI/20106, it is the 
first time to ascertain the extent and parameter of loan to deposit ratio in the range of 78% 
- 100%.  To meet this range, commercial banks are forced to offer as much credit as they 
can, with third party deposits at a constant or increase.  
The main goals of the regulation are to control inflation pressure and liquidity excess 
which, if not controlled, may cause a rise in the inflation, and   to maintain monetary 
stability as well as the financial sector’s stability by effectively managing the liquidity 
excess and intermediary functions of a bank (The Preamble of the GWM Regulation). The 
implicit goal is to boost lending in order to enhance the real sector. Consequently, the 
implementation of the regulation causes a rapid increase in loan growth.  
The Regulation, Allowance for Impairment Loss, and Income Smoothing 
Research results regarding the effect of regulation on income smoothing demonstrate 
conflicting results. Some studies said that the specific regulation can induce managers to 
smooth their income in order to cover their bad financially performance (Haw et al. 2005; 
Pinho and Martin 2009). In the other cases, the implementation of industry-specific 
regulation lower the level of income smoothing (Kwag and Small 2007). Haw et al. (2005) 
examine whether listed Chinese firms manage earnings to meet regulatory benchmarks. 
Pinho and Martins (2009) investigate the impact of regulatory environment on a bank’s 
discretionary provisioning (loan loss provisions) practices in Portugal for period 1990 
through 2000.  Their results show that banks have discretionary behavior in setting up 
their provisions and find evidence of income smoothing and capital management.  
Differ with Haw et al., Pinho and Martins, Kwag and Small (2007) examine the impact of 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on earnings management. They find that the level of 
earnings management lower after the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure. 
A question that naturally arises is how does loan to deposit ratio affect managers’ behavior 
to smooth income through allowance for impairment loss? In accounting or finance 
                                                          
6 regarding Rupiah and Foreign Currency Statutory Reserve Requirements for Commercial Banks, Pasal 10,  
This regulation also deals with the penalty for the banks that failure to meet required LDR of 78-100 percent. For every 1 
percent shortfall, banks must pay the penalty with additional checking deposit of 0.1 percent of total third party fund in 
rupiah. On the other hand, for every 1 percent surplus, banks with capital adequacy ratio which fall below 14 percent are 
required to pay penalty of 0.2 percent of third party fund in rupiah.  
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literature, there is hardly any discussion about the association between loan to deposit 
ratio and income smoothing. However, there is considerable evidence that banks with close 
to minimum capital requirements overstate loan loss provisions (allowance for impairment 
loss), understate loan write-offs, and recognize abnormal realized gains on securities 
portfolios (Moyer 1990; Scholes et al. 1990; Beatty et al. 1995; Collins et al. 1995). The 
evidence also offered strong support that accounting discretion is used to manage industry-
specific regulatory constraints (Healy and Wahlen 1999). Hassine and Jilani (2017) reveal 
that impairment loss is used to manage earnings.  
What is the managers’ motivation to smooth income when the LDR is high? We could not 
find the reason from the literature. However, there is empirical evidence that demonstrate 
that banks with high loans-to-deposit ratio are likely to smooth their earnings (Bhat, 1996). 
Unfortunately, Bhat (1996) does not discuss the reason why high loan to deposit ratio 
encourages the managers to smooth their income. But we could find the reason from 
phenomena perspective. The regulation pushes banks managers to offer more loans in 
order to raise loan to deposit ratio. Theoretically, high loan growth triggers high interest 
revenue and operating income. However, in fact, high loan growth generates high interest 
expense as well as high interest revenue. As a result, operating income is not as high as it 
should be. There is an indication that bank managers smooth their reported income 
through loan loss provision as accrual and as one of their operating income components.   
H1: The implementation of LDR regulation encourages bank managers to smooth their 
income.  
Research Method 
Sample and Data 
The sample consists of all Indonesian commercial banks listed in Indonesian Stock 
Exchange for the periods of 2008 – 2011. The period of 2008 and 2009 represent the 
period before the implementation of the LDR Regulation and the period of 2010 and 2011 
represent the first year implementation of the LDR Regulation. There are thirty commercial 
banks listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange, but this study uses only 28 commercial banks 
due to incomplete data of 2 banks. The data used in this research: annual allowance for 
impairment losses, loan amount, non-performing loan, earnings before taxes and 
allowance, and loan to deposit ratio. The data is collected from banks’ financial reports 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 4/1 (2018) 59-78 
68 
 
which can be found on their websites or from the website of Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
Commercial banks of Indonesia are required to file annual and quarterly consolidated 
balance sheet and income statement along with other information either in their own 
website or in the website of Indonesian Stock Exchange or in both.  
Variable Measurement 
To examine the impact of the implementation of the Regulation on income smoothing 
behavior of banks managers, this study uses multiple regressions with allowance for 
impairment loss (AIL) as the dependent variable. Earnings before tax and allowance 
(EBTA), the existence of the regulation (REG), and loan to deposit ratio (LDR) are 
independent variables. Whereas, accounting standard change (STD), loan provided by 
banks to public (LOAN), non-performing loan (NPL), and banks size (SIZE) are control 
variables.  The measurement of all variables in this study is denoted in Table 3 below. 
Hassine and Jilani (2017) also use allowance for impairment loss as dependent variable. 
Their result indicate that French firms use impairment loss to manage earnings.  
Table 3. The Measurement of all Variables 
Variables Measurement Represent
ed by 
Expected 
Sign of 
Relationship 
Reference 
The regulation 
of loan to 
deposit ratio. 
The existence of the 
regulation, dummy 
variable: 1 for 
availability of the 
regulation (2010 and 
2011) and 0 for 
otherwise (2008 and 
2009).  
REG (-) negative Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2003); 
Anandarajana et al. 
(2007); Alali and 
Jaggi (2011). 
Earnings 
before tax and 
allowance 
Earnings before tax 
and allowance. 
EBTA (+) positive Kilic et al., 2010; 
Anandarajana et al., 
2007; Alali and Jaggi, 
2011. 
Loan to 
deposit ratio. 
 
LDR = Loan/deposit 
LDR (+) positive Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2003); Alali and 
Jaggi (2011) 
Accounting 
standard 
change 
Change of accounting 
standard regarding 
SFAS 50 and 55 
(revised 2006) 
It is measured by 
dummy variable, 0 for 
the implementation of 
STD (-) negative Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2003); 
Anandarajana et al. 
(2007); Alali and 
Jaggi (2011); Hassine 
and Jilani (2017). 
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the standards and 1 the 
otherwise.  
Loan offered 
by bank 
The amount of total 
loan offered by bank.   
LOAN (+) positive Kim and Kross 
(1998), 
Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2003), Kilic et al. 
(2010), and Alali and 
Jaggi (2011) 
Non–
performing 
loan. 
Non – performing loan. NPL (+) positive Kim and Kross 
(1998), 
Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2003), Kilic et al. 
(2010), and Alali and 
Jaggi (2011) 
Firm size Ln of total assets. SIZE (-) negative Alali and Jaggi 
(2011); Obaidat 
(2017); Hassine and 
Jilani (2017). 
Allowance for 
impairment 
loss 
Allowance for 
impairment loss. 
AIL Dependent 
variable 
Hassine and Jilani 
(2017). 
Research Method to Test the Hypothesis 
To examine whether managers use the allowance for impairment loss to smooth income, I 
analyze the relationship between allowance for impairment loss (AIL) and earnings before 
taxes and allowance (EBTA). The empirical research methods demonstrate that to smooth 
income, banks increase the level of allowance for impairment loss when earnings before 
taxes and allowance is high and reduce the level of allowance for impairment loss when 
earnings before taxes and allowance is low. Consequently, a positive coefficient on earnings 
before taxes and allowance reflects smoothing via allowance for impairment loss (Kilic et 
al., 2010; Anandarajana et al., 2007; Alali and Jaggi, 2011). To control the relationship 
between allowance for impairment loss and earnings before taxes and allowance, I use 
control variables non performing loan in current period (NPL), and loan in current period 
(LOAN). It’s demonstrated by the empirical research of Kim and Kross (1998), 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2003), Kilic et al. (2010), and Alali and Jaggi (2011). Following Alali 
and Jaggi (2011), Obaidat (2017), and Hassine and Jilani (2017), I include bank size (SIZE) 
as an additional control variable. Hassine and Jilani (2017) show that bank size (SIZE) is 
negatively significant affect the impairment loss. However, Obaidat (2017) show that size 
has no effect on income smoothing.  
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As control variables, we also use accounting standard change. We considered it because 
commercial banks in Indonesia have to implement SFAS 50 (IAS 32) and 55 (IAS 36) 
(revised 2006) starting on January 2010. The existence of LDR regulation and the issuance 
of new accounting standard statement SFAS 50 and 55 (revised 2006) are measured by 
dummy variable, 0 for the implemented and 1 for not implemented. Hassine and Jilani 
(2017) also use IAS 36 to measure allowance for impairment loss which is used as an 
indication of earnings management.  
The estimated equation for that purpose is: 
 
AILit =β0+β1REG+β2LDRit+β3EBTAit+β4STD+β5LOANit+β6NPLit+β7SIZE+ εit       (1) 
 
where AILit is the allowance for impairment loss for the ith firm in the tth period, REG is the 
existence and implementation of LDR regulation, LDRit is loan to deposit ratio for the ith 
firm in the tth period, EBTAit is earnings before tax and provision for the ith firm in the tth 
period, STD is the implementation of Indonesian SFAS 50 and 55 (revised 2006), LOANit is 
loan amount for the ith firm in the tth period, NPLit is non performing loan for the ith firm in 
the tth period, and SIZEit is firm size for the ith firm in the tth period, β0  is constanta, and β1–
β4 is the coefficient of independent variables, and εit is error term. 
To test the hypothesis we use the t-test of multiple regression of equation 1.  Our research 
hypothesis focuses on whether the issuance of the regulation of LDR encourages manager 
to smooth income. To examine whether the implementation of LDR induce bank managers 
manage their earnings, we use paired sample t-test. We compare cross sectional mean of 
allowance for impairment loss before the implementation of the regulation (2009) and 
after the implementation of the regulation (2011). If mean difference is significant at level 
5%, it indicates that mean of allowance for impairment loss before and after the 
implementation is difference which indicate that the implementation of LDR regulation 
induce bank managers to manage their earnings. Otherwise, if mean difference is not 
significant at level 5%, it indicates that mean of allowance for impairment loss before and 
after the implementation is not difference which indicate that the implementation of LDR 
regulation does not encourage bank managers to smooth their income. 
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Results 
Descriptive Statistic 
Our empirical analysis is based on 112 bank-annual observations. The sample consists of 
Indonesian commercial banks for the period 2008 to 2011. The descriptive statistics for 
our sample banks are presented in Table 4. The sample mean of the allowance for 
impairment loss is 749, 279 million rupiahs, ranging from 7, 880,536.00 million rupiahs to 
zero. The mean of loan to deposit ratio (LDR) is 75.11%, ranging from 108.42% to 40.22%. 
Banks in our sample were profitable during the period examined as indicated by the mean 
earnings before tax and allowance of 2, 696,456 million rupiahs, ranging from 24,547,538 
million rupiahs to losses of 621,408.00 million rupiahs. The sample mean of LOAN, NPL, 
and SIZE are 45, 178,852.00 million rupiahs, 3.43%, and 77,114,951 million rupiahs, 
respectively.  
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
  AIL LDR EBTA LOAN NPL SIZE 
 Mean   749,279    75.11    2,696,456    45,178,852    3.43    77,114,951  
 Median   142,601    77.60    637,502    18,550,557    2.45    32,521,696  
Maximum   788,536    108.42    24,547,538   311,000,000    37.59  
   
552,000,000  
Minimum   0.000000    40.22  
       
(621,408) 
  677,415    0.35    1,259,880  
 Std. Dev.   1,421,827    15.66    4,804,769    65,975,761    5.19  
   
116,000,000  
Notes: AIL is allowance for impairment losses; LDR is loan to deposit ratio; EBTA is earnings before taxes 
allowance; LOAN is loan offered by bank; NPL is non – performing loan; SIZE is bank size. SIZE is measured by 
ln of total assets. The data for descriptive statistic here is total assets.  
 
 
Model Testing 
This study uses panel data. To determine an appropriate model, we must perform Chow 
test and Hausman test. According to both tests, the model is fixed effects. Fixed effects 
model, therefore, is the appropriate model for this study. To detect serial correlation in 
least square regression, we use Durbin-Watson Test. The Durbin Watson Statistics is 
3.274737. It illustrates that there is no statistically significant autocorrelation. To identify 
the heteroskedasticity problem, we use Glejser’s test. Glejser’s test is conducted by 
regressing independent variables to the absolute value of their residuals (Gujarati, 2004). If 
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the effect of all independent variables on their residuals is not statistically significant at 
level 5%, there is no heteroskedasticity problem. The result show that there is no 
heteroscedasticity problem.  
The result of regression can be seen in Table 5 below. Sign of the coefficient of all 
independent variables (REG, LDR, STD, EBTA, LOAN, NPL, and SIZE) are in line with theory 
(negative, positive, negative, positive, positive, positive, negative, respectively) (Haw et al., 
2005; Anandarajana et al., 2007; Kwag and Small, 2007; Pinho and Martin, 2009; Kilic et al., 
2010; Alali and Jaggi, 2011).   
AILit = -14.17351 – 0.376834REGit + 0.694025LDRit – 0.158267STDit + 
1.597189EBTAit + 4.720249LOANit + 0.726169NPLit – 3.401407SIZEit+ εit 
 
Table 5. The Result of Panel Least Square Method 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -14.17 8.69 -1.63 0.11 
REG -0.38 0.18 -2.09 0.04 
LDR 0.69 1.45 0.48 0.63 
STD -0.16 0.18 -0.87 0.39 
EBTA 1.59 0.38 4.26 0.00 
LOAN 4.72 1.58 2.98 0.00 
NPL 0.73 0.36 2.0 0.04 
SIZE -3.40 1.81 -1.88 0.06 
R-squared 0.87    
Adjusted R-squared 0.81    
F-statistic 15.26    
Prob(F-statistic)                                                                    0.00    
     
     Note: Dependent Variable: AIL; method: Panel Least Squares; sample: 2008-2011; periods include: 4; cross 
section include: 28; total observations: 112. Independent variables: the existence of LDR regulation (REG), 
loan to deposit ratio (LDR), the existence of Indonesian SFAS 50 and 55 (revised 2006), earnings before tax 
and allowance (EBTA), loan provided by banks (LOAN), non-performing loan (NPL), and firm size (SIZE).  
 
The result illustrates that the existence of LDR regulation and Indonesian SFAS 50 and 55 
(revised 2006) can reduce the level of earnings management. Every increase of 69% loan to 
deposit ratio, 159% earnings before tax and allowance, 472% loan provided by bank, and 
73% non-performing loan will increase by 1% the allowance for impairment loss. However, 
any decrease of 340% firm size will increase by 1% the allowance for impairment loss. The 
relationship between LDR regulation, EBTA, LOAN, NPL, SIZE and AIL is statistically 
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significant at level of 5%. However, the relation between loan to deposit ratio as well as the 
existence of new standard statement and allowance for impairment loss is not significant.  
Hypothesis Test 
To test whether managers use the allowance for impairment loss to smooth income, we 
utilize the relationship between earnings before taxes and allowance (EBTA) and 
allowance for impairment loss (AIL). The empirical research methods demonstrated that to 
smooth income, banks increase the level of AIL when EBTA is high and reduce the level of 
AIL when EBTA is low. Consequently, a positive coefficient on EBTA reflects smoothing via 
AIL (Anandarajana et al., 2007; Kilic et al., 2010; Alali and Jaggi, 2011).   
The results are exposed in Table 5 above. The correlation between allowance for 
impairment loss (AIL) and earnings before tax and allowance (EBTA) is statistically 
positive significant (β3=1.597189, t-stat. = 4.262465, and prob.= 0.0001). It explains that 
banks increase the level of the allowance when earnings before tax and allowance is high. 
In addition, banks decrease the level of the allowance when earnings before tax and 
allowance are low. This result supports the empirical conclusions that banks managers use 
loan loss provision to smooth their income (Anandarajana et al., 2007; Kilic et al., 2010; 
Alali and Jaggi, 2011).   
To test whether the regulation of LDR induce bank managers to smooth income, we use the 
association between the existence of LDR regulation and allowance for impairment loss. 
Based on table 4 we can see that the impact of LDR on AIL is statistically significant at 5% 
(t-stat. = -2.096490, prob. = 0.0393). This indicates that there is negatively significant 
correlation between LDR regulation and income smoothing of commercial banks in 
Indonesia. It illustrates that the implementation of LDR regulation reduce the level of 
income smoothing.  
To examine whether the implementation of LDR regulation can reduce the level of income 
smoothing, we use paired sample t-test. We compare cross sectional mean of allowance for 
impairment loss before the implementation of the regulation (2008 and 2009) and after the 
implementation of the regulation (2010 and 2011). The result can be seen in Table 6 below.  
 
 
 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 4/1 (2018) 59-78 
74 
 
Table 6. Paired Sample Test 
 Mean Std. Dev. t-test Sign. 
AIL 2008 and 2009 731036.40    
AIL 2010 and 2011 572142.30    
AIL 2008/2009 – AIL 
2010/2011 
58894.00 42234.6 1.901 0.068* 
Notes: AIL is allowance for impairment losses. * It is significant at level 10%, but not significant at level 5%. 
 
Based on the table can be seen that mean of allowance for impairment loss before the 
implementation of LDR regulation is difference with mean of allowance for impairment loss 
after the implementation of LDR regulation. The difference is  significant at level of 10%. It 
indicates that the implementation of LDR regulation does not promote bank managers to 
manage their reported earnings so the level of income smoothing decline. This result 
rejects the hypothesis 1. This result is in line with Kwag and Small, (2007). The level of 
income smoothing is lower after the implementation of LDR regulation.   
Conclusion 
This Paper aims to examine the impact of the implementation of  loan to deposit ratio 
(LDR) regulation (industry-specific regulation) on income smoothing of commercial banks 
in Indonesia. The results demontrate that banks managers manage their reported earnings 
through the allowance for impairment loss. But the implementation of LDR regulation does 
not induce banks managers to smooth their income. The level of income smoothing after 
the LDR regulation is significantly lower than the level of income smoothing before the 
regulation.  The result is not succeeded to support the Hypothesis 1.  This result is in line 
with Kwag and Small, (2007). The level of income smoothing is lower after the 
implementation of LDR regulation.   
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